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Abstract
Governments are widely viewed by academics and practitioners (and society more generally) as the key societal actors 
who are capable of compelling businesses to practice corporate social responsibility (CSR). Arguably, such government 
involvement could be seen as a technocratic device for encouraging ethical business behaviour. In this paper, we offer a more 
politicised interpretation of government engagement with CSR where “CSR” is not a desired form of business conduct but 
an element of discourse that governments can deploy in structuring their relationships with other social actors. We build 
our argument through a historical analysis of government CSR discourse in the Russian Federation. Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics,Verso Books, London, 1985) social theory of 
hegemony underpins our research. We find that “CSR” in the Russian government’s discourse served to legitimise its power 
over large businesses. Using this case, we contribute to wider academic debates by providing fresh empirical evidence 
that allows the development of critical evaluation tools in relation to governments’ engagement with “CSR”. We find that 
governments are capable of hijacking CSR for their own self-interested gain. We close the paper by reflecting on the merit 
of exploring the case of the Russian Federation. As a “non-core”, non-western exemplar, it provides a useful “mirror” with 
which to reflect on the more widely used test-bed of Western industrial democracies when scrutinising CSR. Based on our 
findings, we invite other scholars to adopt a more critical, politicised stance when researching the role of governments in 
relation to CSR in other parts of the world.
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Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), or the idea that 
business organisations should go beyond a certain financial 
performance and legal compliance to contribute to social 
welfare and environmental protection through their opera-
tions (Crane et al. 2013; Dahlsrud 2008) has increasingly 
become an area of government involvement. A growing 
body of literature reveals that national governments across 
the world are employing diverse practices to promote CSR 
(Albareda et al. 2007; 2008; González and Martinez 2004; 
Podsiadlowski and Reichel 2014; Rossouw 2005; Vallentin 
2015a; Waagstein 2011). However, governments’ motivation 
for engagement in and with CSR has not received extensive 
critical attention.
Much of the past and recent critical academic research 
into CSR has focused on the roles of business as political 
actors (e.g. Ehrnström and Fuentes 2016; Fooks et al. 2013; 
Néron 2013; Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Scherer et al. 2014; 
Scherer 2018; Whelan 2012), leaving the issue of the role 
of government actors relatively underdeveloped or neglected 
as a research field. Most existing studies that examine gov-
ernment engagement with CSR tend to focus on the form 
that the government intervention takes or should take (e.g. 
Albareda et al. 2007, 2008; Vallentin and Murillo 2012; 
Keskitalo et al. 2012). That said, some of those studies do 
provide nuanced accounts of government policies and mech-
anisms, and some do adopt political and critical approaches. 
For instance, Vallentin (2015a) and Vallentin and Murillo 
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(2012) demonstrate that a single government’s CSR initia-
tives can be informed by different and often contradictory 
ideological understandings of CSR, each with its own set 
of assumptions and exclusions promoting a specific “truth” 
about CSR (Vallentin, 2015a, p. 40).
However, to date, the underlying logic of a government’s 
engagement with CSR has received limited analytical scru-
tiny. Overwhelmingly, the existing literature implicitly 
or explicitly assumes that the role of governments in this 
policy area is underpinned by a sense of accountability to 
the electorate and an attendant obligation to address certain 
social goals, meet environmental protection standards and/
or particular economic growth objectives. In this context, 
governments are largely understood as socially- and/or busi-
ness-oriented actors and are not considered to be “political” 
actors with their own interests: they are thought to be merely 
serving or assisting the public good.
Moreover, business-government relations, specifically in 
the CSR policy area, are not typically seen as being politi-
cally confrontational but mainly as cooperation and col-
laboration designed to build “acceptable” regulatory envi-
ronments and achieve common aims (e.g. Midttun 2005). 
We suggest that these assumptions need to be examined 
critically, particularly if we are to provide explanations of 
government (in)effectiveness in promoting ethical business 
behaviour and in order to have the tools to question the 
legitimacy of government activity (Edward and Willmott 
2013). Accordingly, the primary purpose of this paper is to 
expound a particular political understanding of government 
engagement with CSR and develop an approach that permits 
a critical interpretation and evaluation.
Our thinking is informed by the writings of Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, in particular, their social theory 
of hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Mouffe 2013). The 
“political” is central to Laclau and Mouffe’s understand-
ing of social relations and it is conceptualised as requiring 
two components—antagonism and hegemony. They under-
stand the “political” as an antagonistic relationship between 
social actors where the identity of a given social actor is both 
constituted through and threatened by the presence of oth-
ers (Mouffe 2013). Political action is, therefore, seen as an 
articulatory, discursive process where social actors attempt 
to formulate and convey their own and others’ identities in 
competing ways. Successful articulations erase antagonisms 
and establish a (temporary) dominance of one discursive 
ideological structure. Such articulations are termed “hegem-
onic” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Consequently, society as a 
whole is seen a product of hegemonic articulations (Mouffe 
2013).
This approach to the “political” differs from the exist-
ing “politically embedded accounts” (Vallentin and Murillo 
2012, p. 828) of government roles in CSR, where, for exam-
ple, an institutional or national business systems approach 
sees governments in different nation states as the regulatory 
backdrops that shape the prevailing CSR understanding and 
practice but do not occupy antagonistic positions in relation 
to other social actors (see for example, Jamali and Karam 
2018; Kang and Moon 2011; Matten and Moon 2008). It also 
differs from Scherer and Palazzo’s (2011) “political CSR” 
that defines CSR as the corporate contribution to global gov-
ernance and the provision of public goods through delibera-
tive and democratic collaboration with other social actors.
More significantly, another key difference is in the 
understanding of the ontological status of CSR. Laclau and 
Mouffe’s framework allows the treatment of government 
engagement with CSR as a political activity by understand-
ing “CSR” not as a set of desired organisational behaviours 
but as an element of discourse with particular constitu-
tive functions. The notion of discourse is central to Laclau 
and Mouffe’s conceptualisation. Discourses are broadly 
defined as structured complexes of textual and non-textual 
practices—utterances, images—that can be employed, 
consciously or unconsciously, by various social actors to 
produce certain meanings, legitimise certain positions and 
marginalise others (Howarth 1998; Spicer and Fleming 
2007; Walton and Boon 2014). For example, Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) suggest that established terms such as “order” 
or “democracy” can function as “empty signifiers” or dis-
cursive elements that are themselves devoid of meaning but 
can be employed to erase social antagonisms and establish 
certain discourses as hegemonic. Similarly, other scholars 
have demonstrated how notions such as “sustainability” and 
“environmental protection” can function as empty signifiers 
that help articulate particular business practices as aligned 
with environmental concerns (Archel et al. 2011; Brown 
2016; Davidson 2010; Methmann 2010; Stavrakakis 1997). 
By these means, business actors can associate themselves, 
or are associated by others, with environmental concerns 
without establishing a single understanding of either the 
nature of environmental concerns or the actions needed to 
address them. If and when the meaning of “sustainability” 
and “environmental protection” is substantiated, it remains 
conditional, resting on the particular circumstances of indi-
vidual social actors. Crucially, the studies above politicise 
the notions of “environmental protection” and “sustainabil-
ity” by presenting them not as mere denotations of techni-
cal mechanisms and processes and but as vehicles of power 
in themselves that allow social actors to create hegemonic 
discourses (Laclau 2007; Howarth 1998; Methmann 2010; 
Swyngedouw 2011). Reflecting on whether “CSR” may sim-
ilarly function as an empty signifier allows us to view it as 
a discursive device that governments can deploy to buttress 
particular political positions whilst not necessarily pursuing 
responsible firm behaviour as a primary objective.
We support our contention about the politicisation of gov-
ernment engagement with the “CSR” notion by analysing 
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the government discourse in one country, the Russian Fed-
eration, during one particular historical period, 1991–2012. 
Our analysis indicates that the office of the President of the 
Russian Federation used “CSR” as a discursive device that 
helped it locate large Russian businesses as subordinate to 
the government and legitimise the government coercion of 
those business organisations. Accordingly, we proffer a theo-
retical understanding of government use of the CSR notion 
not only as a technical or technocratic exercise in achieving 
particular social and economic goals, but also as a political 
activity where governments can employ the signifier “CSR” 
in power struggles to position themselves in certain ways 
vis-à-vis other social actors.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: we 
start by discussing three main established interpretations of 
government engagement with CSR. We then show how these 
explanations implicitly presume that government actions are 
driven by social accountability and the cooperative pursuit of 
common goals. Next, we explain how Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(1985) social theory of hegemony may help assemble a more 
critical understanding of government involvement with CSR. 
After outlining our methods, we present our analysis of the 
Russian government’s engagement with CSR through the 
lens of Laclau and Mouffe’s social theory of hegemony. The 
article closes with a summary of our findings and a discus-
sion of how we see the contributions of our study in rela-
tion to the existing scholarly discussions on governmental 
engagement with CSR.
Accounting for Government Engagement 
with CSR: Some Alternative Explanations
It is possible to identify several main interpretations of how 
and why governments may involve themselves in CSR, rang-
ing from the perceived decline of states to the putative fail-
ure of a voluntary approach to CSR and to the consequence 
of insufficient business resources or the government as a 
self-interested political actor. We now turn to discuss each of 
these understandings in turn so as to provide the context for 
subsequent empirical and theoretical sections of this paper.
A Consequence of State Decline?
When attempting to account for government engagement 
with CSR, the first explanation that emerges from the extant 
literature is the putative decline of states and governmental 
authority. Many studies of government engagement in CSR 
observe that the power balance between governments and 
business has shifted in favour of the latter (Moon 2004). 
Some authors argue that governments are unable to cope 
with the increasing complexity of economic and political 
life, leaving a regulatory void that powerful business actors 
exploit for their own ends. In what Santoro (2010, p. 286) 
calls the “post-Westphalian globalisation narrative”, multi-
national corporations are seen as particularly powerful (Kob-
rin 2009; Scherer et al. 2009; Scherer and Palazzo 2011). 
The lack of enforceable international regulation allows 
them to seize a leading role in shaping the “global rules 
of the game” (van Oosterhout 2010, p. 257). Multination-
als’ wealth, knowledge, and capabilities are also often so 
substantial, especially in comparison with those of govern-
ments in developing countries where they operate that the 
citizenry of those countries may well turn towards multi-
nationals instead of their own government as an essential 
supplier of social goods (Beddewela and Fairbrass 2015; 
van Oosterhout 2010). In extreme cases, multinational cor-
porations become de-facto governments by controlling and 
maintaining infrastructure, social services, and security 
forces (Banerjee 2008, 2010). Similar trends can also be 
discerned in the industrialised world where governments are 
increasingly withdrawing from administering certain areas 
of public life such as infrastructure and healthcare through 
the mechanisms of privatisation and market liberalisation 
(Moon 2005; Steurer 2010).
In this context, CSR promotion is seen as an alterna-
tive method for governments to steer business activity and 
achieve social and environmental objectives (Standing 
2007). With an emphasis on the voluntary commitment 
of corporations towards ethical behaviour, CSR can be 
regarded as a form of “soft law” that can assist governments 
in delivering their social and environmental objectives in 
areas where “hard law” is absent, impractical or resisted 
(Steurer 2010). Equally, Vallentin and Murillo (2012) and 
Vallentin (2015a) herald CSR facilitation as a “governmen-
tality” approach for controlling businesses that relies on re-
shaping the social norms of business conduct rather than 
influencing firms through direct regulation.
A Result of Failing Voluntary CSR?
The second reason cited in the existing literature which 
rationalises and calls for the active government involvement 
in CSR is the assertion that a purely voluntary approach 
would fail to deliver responsible behaviour in firms. This 
perspective, in contrast to the one above, views the nation 
states as still powerful and significant and holds that the 
voluntary nature of CSR allows corporations to shape their 
practices in a way that primarily or solely rewards business 
owners rather than other stakeholders (Eberhard-Harribey 
2006; Fairbrass 2011). In the absence of a powerful societal 
actor, such as a government, which could counterbalance 
the dominance of corporations in defining “responsibility”, 
business interests can hijack the CSR agenda. Essentially, 
governments act (or need to act) as a “referee” whose role 
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it is to enforce ethical and responsible behaviour amongst 
otherwise misbehaving firms.
There is also recognition that market mechanisms may be 
insufficient to ensure responsible conduct (Aaronson 2007; 
Fairbrass 2011). This renders voluntary CSR a second-best 
alternative to government regulation in many areas (Vogel 
2005, p. 164). In much of the current capitalist discourse, 
economic efficiency is more highly valued than meeting the 
demands of non-shareholder in defining the social legiti-
macy of the firm (Banerjee 2010). Moreover, many social 
groups who are adversely affected by corporate activity are 
simply not powerful enough to challenge such entrenched 
notions of corporate legitimacy. In any case, consumers 
and employees may refuse to bear the cost of responsible 
behaviour in the form of higher prices and lower compensa-
tion (Vogel 2005). Furthermore, small and medium-sized 
enterprises, which are not particularly visible in the public 
domain, tend not to face the same external pressures as large 
firms that would otherwise encourage them to act responsi-
bly (Lynch-Wood et al. 2009). Finally, it would be illogical 
to expect companies operating in countries with weak insti-
tutional systems to voluntarily behave responsibly as one of 
the reasons why they may have chosen to operate in such a 
location is precisely the lack of government enforcement of 
responsible behaviour (Newell 2005).
A Consequence of Insufficient Business Resources, 
Expertise, or Power?
The third strand of literature is conceptually similar to the 
studies on failing voluntary CSR: it also acknowledges the 
continuing significance of the nation state (Vallentin and 
Murillo 2012). However, it does not generally regard vol-
untary CSR as problematic (Albareda et al. 2007). On the 
contrary, voluntary CSR is often defined in terms of:
…business opportunities and value surplus as opposed 
to social problems, government deficits or governance 
gaps. (Vallentin 2015a, p. 41).
Government-driven or orchestrated CSR is a means of 
achieving business competitiveness whilst simultaneously 
contributing to national economic growth and development 
(Vallentin and Murillo 2012; Porter and Kramer 2006). 
Business, however, is regarded as potentially lacking the 
required resources, expertise, and social legitimacy or power 
to develop and execute voluntary CSR programmes with suf-
ficient effectiveness and, therefore, require the help of more 
powerful and better resourced actors such as governments. 
Government intermediation may be needed because firms, 
while acting responsibly in some areas, demonstrate weak 
progress is others fields such as labour rights and corruption. 
Businesses alone may not have the capacity to address the 
broad systemic problems or developmental needs of whole 
countries (Barkemeyer 2009).
To illustrate this further, it should be noted that govern-
ments can and do build information portals, provide techni-
cal assistance, and organise professional networks (Albareda 
et  al. 2007; Fox et  al. 2002). The writings of Vallentin 
(2015a) and Vallentin and Murillo (2012) are particularly 
seminal in this area as they explicitly recognise the “posi-
tive” as opposed to the “restrictive” role that governments 
can play in facilitating responsible business conduct. These 
scholars cite the example of Denmark where the government 
has initiated information and training programmes target-
ing small and medium enterprises in order to “mainstream” 
CSR and “help” SMEs with limited resources “manage 
social and environmental challenges in the supply chain and 
comply with demands and expectations from governments, 
industry and NGOs” (Vallentin 2015a, p. 40). Vallentin and 
Murillo (2012, p. 826) describe how the Danish govern-
ment is increasingly working “to help private companies 
identify/create and act upon strategic opportunities in their 
environment.”
Specifically in relation to large businesses, Vallentin 
(2015a, p. 41) found that the Danish government attempted 
to “inspire” companies to be more proactive in the CSR 
domain through instituting mandatory CSR reporting that 
nonetheless does not require the companies to actually 
engage in CSR. Additionally, the Danish government took 
a lead in creating an independent forum where government, 
business, and civil society would come together to address 
disputes involving business breaches of human rights. Busi-
ness organisations on their own would not have possessed 
the legitimacy required for an establishment of such a forum.
Having considered some of the widely discussed explana-
tions for government in CSR, we now move to reflect on the 
role of governments as “socially responsible actors” with a 
view to exploring further their motivations and raising some 
questions about how and why governments engage in CSR.
The Critical Question: Governments as Socially 
Responsible Actors?
Given the discussion above, it could be implied that govern-
ment engagement with CSR is motivated by the necessity 
to address the needs of its own stakeholders: the electorate, 
the business community, and the economy as a whole. In 
rare direct statements, Albareda et al. (2008) and Midttun 
(2005) buttress this understanding by characterising the role 
of government as a “regulator” and “supporter” of business 
and as a “provider” of public services and an “aggregator” of 
collective social interests. According to these accounts, CSR 
is understood as a goal—responsible business conduct—that 
the government is attempting to achieve in order to address 
social, environmental and economic concerns.
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This understanding of government engagement with CSR 
and of the function of CSR in government activity and rhetoric 
has not been much critically discussed or questioned. Govern-
ments may be seen to be benign and disinterested altruistic 
actors. By contrast, some scholars outside business and man-
agement studies do adopt more critical outlook on govern-
ment activity. For instance, political scientists tend to view 
governments as potentially self-interested social actors (Caselli 
and Cunningham 2009). De Mesquita et al. (2005) in their 
influential text The Logic of Political Survival argue that the 
main goal of any incumbent government and its officers is to 
remain in that position.
At this juncture, it is important to emphasise that previous 
and recent CSR studies routinely suggest that business organi-
sations’ primary motivation for engaging in CSR is their own 
successful continuation. This can take the form of a “business 
case for CSR” where profit motives underlying CSR activi-
ties are regarded as healthy and legitimate. By contrast, other 
authors critique the “business case” for ultimately prioritising 
the needs of the owners and investors at the expense of other 
stakeholders (e.g. Brei and Böhm 2013). The viability of the 
“political CSR” model underpinned by deliberative democ-
racy (Scherer and Palazzo 2011) has also been questioned in 
terms of the fundamental self-interest of corporations (Whelan 
2012). Vallentin (2015b), in a review of critical perspectives 
of CSR, writes about the politicised understanding of CSR 
advanced by critical scholars as one which points to the ulti-
mate self-interests of business actors and to CSR functioning 
“as an ideological cover-up for modern corporate capitalism” 
(p. 15). Whichever view is adopted, an understanding of CSR 
as something other than an authentic business effort to address 
social and environmental concerns is central to critical CSR 
literature.
We suggest that a critical attitude should also be extended 
to include government engagement with CSR, a task that has 
been largely neglected until now, thus positioning govern-
ments as “political actors” and not merely “technical regu-
lators”. We contend that the motivations of governments 
need to be scrutinised as rigorously as those of business 
actors. Ultimately, we consider the possibility that from the 
point of view of governments, the function of “CSR” notion 
may not be limited to a representation of responsible busi-
ness conduct: it may serve other less benevolent goals. The 
next section explains the philosophical underpinnings of our 
critique.
Social Theory of Hegemony and “CSR” 
as a Political Tool
Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) social theory of hegemony has 
provided the tools to politicise widely used concepts such 
as “order” and “freedom” by considering their constitutive 
function as elements of discourse as opposed to treating 
them as denotations of specific social phenomena. The social 
theory of hegemony explains how certain discursive ele-
ments can become devices that make possible the establish-
ment of hegemonies (i.e. dominant discourses that shape 
sensemaking within societies). A similar re-consideration 
of the ontological status of “CSR” would permit us to exam-
ine it, not as a form of organisational behaviour (that may 
be either universal or vary from one institutional context 
to another), but as a political device. This approach leads 
to an examination of government engagement with “CSR” 
not only as an exercise in reaching a particular technocratic 
objective (such as reduced environmental pollution), but also 
as part of the struggle for political legitimacy and influence 
in relation to other social actors.
In Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) framework, discourse has 
constitutive power. They conceptualise social relations and 
sensemaking as being constituted through discourse, and 
define discourse as temporarily and partially fixed systems 
of meanings that influence “cognitive scripts, categories 
and rationalities” (Torfing 1999, p. 82). The discourses that 
come to suppress or incorporate other competing discourses 
are regarded as “hegemonic”.
The fundamentals of this approach derive from Saussu-
rean linguistics where language is treated as a system of 
relations between signifiers (e.g. assemblages of letters and 
sounds that form words) and signified (the meanings). The 
relationship between the signifier and the signified itself is 
arbitrary: any signifier can be attached to any signified. As 
signifiers can be attached to many signified, they are said 
to be “overdetermined” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 98) 
and the links between signifiers and signified are not reified: 
for example, for some the meaning of “Corporate Social 
Responsibility” has evolved over time from “philanthropy” 
to “ethics of core company activities” (Carroll 1999).
In addition, the substance of the identity (also known as 
a “sign”) that results from the link between a signifier and 
a signified is not essential but emerges only in a differen-
tial relationship with other identities (Torfing 1999). For 
instance, “CSR” can only be understood in a differential 
relation to concepts such as “profit” or “shareholder value”. 
Language, therefore, is an unstable “relational system of dif-
ferences” (Methmann 2010, p. 351).
In this context, discourse is a structure that includes cer-
tain differentially related identities and excludes others, tem-
porarily fixing the relationships between them. This fixing 
is accomplished through the process of “articulation” that 
modifies the identities of free-floating discursive “elements” 
that may have many meanings into fixed “moments” with a 
specific meaning within a particular discourse (Laclau and 
Mouffe1985, p. 105). Articulation involves two contradic-
tory but nonetheless co-existing logics—that of difference 
and of equivalence. The logic of difference temporarily fixes 
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the meaning of elements through emphasising their particu-
lar mutual differences. The logic of equivalence seeks to 
delimit the boundaries of a discursive system by emphasis-
ing a “certain sameness” between differentially articulated 
moments (Torfing 1999, p. 301). For instance, differing 
political parties in one country can all present themselves 
as committed to “law and order” even though individually 
their understanding of what equates to an acceptable form 
of order and order-keeping differs. The empty signifier 
“law and order” serves to articulate the diverging parties as 
equivalent and united in their commitment to “order”. Over-
determination of signifiers and the existence of competing 
discourses, however, prevents a permanent fixing of mean-
ings. Hence, a discourse is always an unstable and “fictitious 
fixing of meaning” (Laclau 1996, p. 205).
From Laclau and Mouffe’s perspective, political struggles 
involve different parties attempting to hegemonise their own 
versions of equivalential or differential relations (Torfing 
1999). Hegemonic discourses that emerge as (temporary) 
winners of political struggles are distinguished by their suc-
cess in emphasising the equivalence between diverse range 
of positions and identities, including antagonistic ones 
(Torfing 1999, p. 101). The integration of diverse positions 
into one discursive totality simplifies the political space by 
articulating disparate causes as having similar objectives 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 130). The consequences of such 
integration can be the formation of a hegemonic discourse 
in order to realise the chosen goals.
The logic of equivalence that underlies hegemonies is 
made possible by the presence of a privileged category of 
signifiers that Laclau and Mouffe (1985) call “nodal points” 
in relation to which separate elements can be articulated as 
equivalent. The signifiers that form nodal points are in them-
selves empty of specific meaning, hence they are also called 
“empty signifiers”. They are empty because if they had a 
specific meaning, they would simply become one more dif-
ference in a system of relational differences (Laclau 2007). 
Instead, they have the potential to represent a chain of other 
signifiers, or to be filled with a variety of meanings, with the 
different meanings “sliding” under them (Torfing 1999, p. 
301; Davidson 2010). They also perform a naming function 
and create the possibility of diverse groups and positions 
being united under one label (Contu and Girei 2014; Laclau 
2007).
Thus, empty signifiers can temporarily suture social 
divisions by providing a single point of reference for other-
wise diverging positions. For example, Stavrakakis (1997) 
describes how differing social practices have been allowed to 
become part of the “green” discourse by simply being named 
“green.” Empty signifiers represent the “systematicity of 
the [discursive] system” (Laclau 2007, p. 39). Establishing 
hegemony involves deciding which meanings are allowed to 
slide under the empty signifiers (Laclau 2007).
The process of signifiers becoming nodal points is not 
arbitrary one. They can derive from a variety of “residual 
institutions”—earlier articulations, existing normative 
frameworks or broader established discourses—that make 
them meaningful and legitimate to many actors (Nabers 
2009, p. 197; Edward and Willmott 2013; Kenny and Scriver 
2012). Long-established signifiers such as “freedom”, 
“democracy”, and “order” often play a role in the construc-
tion of hegemonies.
“CSR” and related terms such as “sustainability” and 
“business responsibility”, owing to their increasing use, have 
a clear potential to become empty signifiers. For example, 
Methmann (2010) describes how “climate protection” func-
tions as an empty signifier and allows various social actors to 
articulate themselves as environmentally responsible without 
changing their practices. Brown (2016) similarly shows that 
essential emptiness of “sustainability” allows diverse social 
actors to present their activities as sustainable when, argu-
ably, they are not actually sustainable. For example, David-
son (2010) describes how “sustainability” allowed for the 
development of new partnerships and organisational agendas 
in urban planning in Vancouver:
[Sustainability]… [b]rought together a divergent group 
of practitioners via the notion that all are, in some way, 
involved in sustainability (p. 398).
This allowed different parties to re-imagine existing activi-
ties as relating to sustainability and provided them with a 
sense of coherence and unity. All these examples, however, 
largely concern the critique of the use of sustainability and 
related concepts by business actors to support the neo-liberal 
hegemony that benefits them (Fougère and Solitander 2009). 
Below, in our paper, we apply the Laclau and Mouffe frame-
work to examine the use of CSR concept by government 
actors in the Russian Federation.
Methods
We have selected Russian federal government CSR policy 
as an illustrative case to support our contention that govern-
ment engagement with CSR should be treated more critically 
for the following reasons. Firstly, given that the Russian gov-
ernment has not been particularly known for its focus on 
social and environmental concerns, this is a fruitful situation 
in which to explore governmental uses of the “CSR” term 
that may not have been driven by such considerations (De 
Mesquita et al. 2005). In addition, during the time period 
that we examine, Russian governments did begin to engage 
with the subject of non-financial responsibility of business 
and so could provide us with illuminating data. The form 
of engagement we observed could be said to resemble the 
“agora” approach (Albareda et al. 2008; Crotty 2014), that 
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is the creation of and participation in forums where CSR 
and related topics were discussed by various stakeholders 
and certain expectations with regard to responsible business 
conduct were expressed. Finally, the development of Rus-
sian government CSR engagement contained both periods 
of relative lack of conflict between government and business 
and also periods of open antagonism. Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(1985) pre-condition for the emergence of empty signifiers 
is social antagonism or the existence of opposing discursive 
positions.
[T]he two conditions of hegemonic articulation are the 
presence of antagonistic forces and the instability of 
frontiers which separate them (pp. 134–136).
Thus, periods of antagonism between the Russian govern-
ment and businesses offers a fertile ground for the examina-
tion of “CSR” as an empty signifier. The periods of relative 
accord and harmony furnish a useful comparison.
At the start of our analysis below, we provide a brief 
description of the different periods in the emergence of 
Russian federal government-business relations as a way to 
contextualise the interpretation of our data. We delineate the 
temporal boundaries of our research from the establishment 
of the Russian Federation in 1991 to the mature stage of the 
international financial crisis in 2012. Whilst pre-1991 and 
post-2012 events are by no means irrelevant, the demise of 
the Soviet Union and the 2014 conflict with Ukraine cre-
ated radically different societal and political relations within 
Russia, and their analysis is outside the scope of this article.
With regard to the specific data collection and analyses 
methods, Laclau and Mouffe are famously non-specific 
(Jørgensen and Philips 2002; Howarth 1998; Walton and 
Boon 2014). As a result, in translating our theoretical stance 
into specific research methods we relied on existing publi-
cations containing discourse analyses based on the social 
theory of hegemony (e.g. Contu and Girei 2014; Contu et al. 
2013; Kenny and Scriver 2012; Methmann 2010) and on the 
attempt by Walton and Boon (2014) to explicitly construct a 
Laclau and Mouffe-inspired discourse analysis methodology.
We constructed our case study by analysing both ver-
bal and written utterances1 of the Russian federal govern-
ment and parliamentary officials that included the “CSR” 
term and related terms such as “responsibility of business”. 
The English term “Corporate Social Responsibility” trans-
lates straightforwardly into Russian as “Кopпopaтивнaя 
Coциaльнaя Oтвeтcтвeннocть”. It is, however, often short-
ened to “responsibility of business” (“oтвeтcтвeннocть 
бизнeca”) or “social responsibility” (“coциaльнaя 
oтвeтcтвeннocть”) or adjusted somewhat to “social 
responsibility of business” (“coциaльнaя oтвeтcтвeннocть 
бизнeca”). These are terms that are less cumbersome to 
pronounce in Russian but that carry the same broad con-
notations of business conduct that is mindful of its impact 
on society and environment.2 We employed all these terms 
in our data search and treated all of them as potential empty 
signifiers equivalent to “CSR”.
Our data set included a variety of Russian federal govern-
ment records such as legislature and presidential decrees, 
policy papers, and national strategy documents publicly 
available in online repositories. We supplemented the gov-
ernment documentation with a large volume of data on busi-
ness-government CSR-related interaction from less formal 
sources such as newspapers and news channels. Our data 
search was systematic: we ensured that we covered every 
year between 1991 and 2012, explored documents relevant 
to every major government body (the parliament and the 
office of the president), and traced the utterances of key state 
officials (namely Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev). We 
searched for documents that contained “CSR” and equiva-
lent terms and also for those we could reasonably expect to 
contain them (e.g. policy documents on Russian national 
sustainable development). As we aimed to explore “CSR” as 
an empty signifier, we did not look for the use of “CSR” and 
equivalent terms that was aligned with a specific definition 
but solely for the presence of “CSR” and equivalent terms 
such as “responsibility of business” in the text.
As a result, we amassed a large variety of sources: presi-
dential decrees, government reports, news articles, tran-
scripts of parliamentary hearings, records of televised inter-
views, accounts of meetings with state officials published by 
business organisations, and video recordings of government 
officials’ speeches.
Our analysis of the documents focused on articulations 
and the chain of equivalence produced through the use of the 
“CSR” (or equivalent) signifier (Howarth 1998). It included 
two distinct but partially overlapping stages. The first stage 
involved mapping out the timeline of the Russian govern-
ment’s use of the “CSR” term and the contexts where it 
took place. The skeleton for the timeline was provided by 
the existing publications on the history of the business-
government relations in post-Soviet Russia. We coded our 
textual data, noting how the extent of government references 
1 One of the authors of this paper is a native Russian speaker, which 
allowed for the analysis of texts that are not normally available in 
English.
2 For example, the terms “Corporate Social Responsibility” and 
“social responsibility” are used interchangeably in the parliamentary 
hearings on the subject of “Corporate Social Responsibility in Rus-
sia: Aims, tasks, legislative provision” (Federal Council of RF 2007), 
and the terms “Corporate Social Responsibility” and “responsibility 
of business” are used interchangeably in the parliamentary hearings 
titled “Corporate Social Responsibility in the period of crisis: Chal-
lenges, experience, possibilities” (Federal Council of RF 2009).
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to “CSR” (or equivalent) varies across different historical 
periods set out in the skeleton timeline. In addition, we iden-
tified the different fora (such as formal policy documents, 
parliamentary hearings) and different relational situations 
(including the interactions between the president and the 
business leaders versus the interactions between the parlia-
ment and the business leaders) where terms such as “CSR” 
and “responsibility of business” appeared. This allowed us 
to develop an overall understanding of the events and the 
social actors involved that structured our subsequent inter-
pretation and helped us identify patterns in our data (Contu 
and Girei 2014; Walton and Boon 2014). It also meant that 
in the second stage of analysis we could employ a logic 
of deconstruction, in other words we could make visible 
the contingent nature of “CSR” significations by examin-
ing how these significations changed across time periods 
and relational contexts (Kenny and Scriver 2012; Spicer and 
Fleming 2007). Finally, an analysis of the ways in which the 
intensity of the use of “CSR” (or equivalent) varied across 
temporal and relational contexts contributed to our conten-
tion that “CSR” functioned as an empty signifier.
In the second stage, we explored and coded the articula-
tions of “CSR” and equivalent terms such as “responsibility 
of business” in the government discourse. We also identified 
the themes that were closely linked to these terms: for exam-
ple, presidential explanations of why Russian businesses 
should care about responsibility or the topics that consist-
ently served as background for the discussion of responsibil-
ity. Overall, we searched for paradigmatic relationships (a 
relationship where discursive elements are able to stand for 
one another) between “CSR” or equivalent terms and other 
elements present in the government discourse (Contu and 
Girei 2014). This allowed us to determine the discursive 
chain of equivalence held together by the “CSR” signifier. 
From this process we were able to discern the function that 
the “CSR” played in the government discourse.
While we did not purposefully set out to analyse CSR-
related discourses used by social actors other than the gov-
ernment, we could not help but note the Russian business 
leaders’ articulation of “business responsibility”. This was 
a side-effect of the fact that many government CSR-related 
iterations occurred in the context of discussions with the 
business leaders. A systematic analysis of business articula-
tions was outside the remit of this paper. Nonetheless, the 
business articulations that we captured do provide a point of 
comparison that revealed the “slippage” (Spicer and Fleming 
2007, p. 521) in the articulations of “CSR” and enriched our 
understanding of the function of the “CSR” signifier in the 
Russian governments’ discourse.
The two-phase analysis is reflected in our report of the 
findings below. We begin by briefly outlining the key peri-
ods in the development of the Russian federal government-
business relations. We then use this timeline to discuss 
the timing of the appearance of the “CSR” (or equivalent) 
signifier in government discourse. This is followed by an 
examination of how “CSR” was articulated across differ-
ent relational contexts and by an in-depth exposition of the 
“CSR” articulations in the context that emerged as the most 
important forum: the meetings between the President of the 
Russian Federation and the leaders of major Russian compa-
nies. Finally, we bring all the elements together in a discus-
sion on the function of the “CSR” signifier in the Russian 
government discourse.
The Case of Russian Federal CSR Policy
The History of Russian Federal Government—
Business Relations
Yakovlev (2006), Rutland (2011), Frye (2002, 2006), and 
Hanson and Teague (2005) provide useful analyses of busi-
ness-government relations in post-Soviet Russia. Typically, 
three main historical periods are identified by these authors: 
the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1991–1999), the presidency 
of Vladimir Putin (2000–2005), and the later presidency 
and prime ministry of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medve-
dev (post-2005). The first period is commonly characterised 
by the dominance of the business interests over the federal 
government and the second by a radical shift in this balance 
of power that created an antagonistic ground for hegemonic 
political struggle. The third period saw relative stability that 
resulted from the federal government gaining control over 
business interests.
The 1990s saw both federal and local government being 
dominated by business interests to the extent that different 
federal agencies competed with each other while supporting 
different business factions. Widespread corruption resulted. 
While the presidential office served as the only available 
source of arbitration for large businesses at the federal level, 
the President and political parties were heavily dependent on 
the oligarchs as a source of finance for access to the media 
at election times. Two noteworthy consequences of these 
business-government relations were endemic tax evasion by 
businesses and a privatisation process that saw vast quan-
tities of assets, previously belonging to the public, being 
appropriated and concentrated in a few well-connected 
hands. To this day, the latter endures in the memory of the 
Russian people as a traumatic event and perpetuates public 
mistrust of businesses.
After the 1998 financial crisis, the federal government 
had to orchestrate a renewal of its own leadership to ensure 
its continuation. Vladimir Putin was chosen as the new face 
of the federal power, first as a prime minister and then as 
Yeltsin’s successor. His urgent concern was building a “ver-
tical of power” consisting of a clearly delineated, legitimate 
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hierarchy with the president at the top and regional admin-
istrations and industry interests below and result in the “rule 
of law” (Brown 2001; Monaghan 2012). To accomplish 
this, the federal executive extended support to the army, the 
national security and law enforcement apparatus. The rela-
tionship between the federal authorities and large business 
was made explicitly more “equidistant”, replacing personal 
informal meetings (at private country retreats) with offi-
cial formal engagements (in the Kremlin). The President 
demanded that business be represented by official associa-
tions. The early 2000s saw the rapid growth of business 
organisations such as the Russian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs (RUIE), which represented established 
oligarchs mainly from extractive industries.
Open antagonism between the President of the Russian 
Federation and business leaders such as Boris Berezovsky 
and Vladimir Gusinsky, who resisted the new order, was 
typical of the period. A poignant turning point was the 2003 
meeting between president Putin and business leaders. At the 
meeting, the head of the Yukos oil conglomerate Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, who funded political opposition and, alleg-
edly, harboured political ambitions of his own, accused the 
president’s office of orchestrating corrupt acquisitions trans-
actions. The story of Khodorkovsky’s subsequent arrest on 
tax evasion charges, conviction, and protracted imprison-
ment featured widely in the global press. The event clearly 
demonstrated that the Kremlin had tax inspectors, the courts 
and the security services at its disposal. By 2005, the Rus-
sian executive had largely gained control over business. 
This paved the way for relative stability and the absence of 
government-business antagonism post-2005.
The Timing of Government‑Business “CSR” 
Discussions
Our analysis shows that most of the federal government 
iterations involving the “CSR” term were made during the 
2000–2005 period when the government-business antago-
nism was at its peak. Previously, during the Yeltsin years, 
the government did not employ the terms “responsibility of 
business” or “CSR” and, at best, engaged in a limited dis-
cussion of the role of business in addressing environmental 
and social problems in Russia. These roles were first men-
tioned 2 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991. It began with an attempt to develop envi-
ronmental and social legislation that would support national 
sustainable development policy. The initial thrust came in 
the form of a presidential decree on Fundamentals of State 
Strategy of Russian Federation on Environmental Protec-
tion and the Guarantee of Sustainable Development (Presi-
dent of RF 1994). This was followed by a number of other 
decrees. These early documents were mainly concerned with 
environmental legislation and depicted business organisa-
tions solely as objects of government regulation.
In the 2000–2005 period, the references to “responsi-
bility of business” and equivalent terms in formal policy 
documents continued to be very limited. The sole document 
to employ a related term in this period was Key Points of 
Russian Sustainable Development Strategy by the Federal 
Council3 (Federal Council of RF 2002). It advocated further 
legislation and promoted the “moral responsibility” of every 
individual in the country, including those individuals acting 
as business leaders. The Federal Council also published a 
report, specifically about CSR, which was designed as infor-
mation bulletin rather than an expression of government 
expectations (Federal Council of RF 2005). The scarcity of 
formal policy and parliamentary debate, however, was more 
than compensated by multiple verbal pronouncements by the 
president on the subject of “CSR” in direct communication 
with business leaders. We will examine them in detail below.
Once the government had gained control over business 
in 2005, the appearances of the “CSR” and related terms 
become less frequent in the presidential discourse. They 
increase again in speeches by President Dmitry Medvedev in 
2010 when the effects of the international financial crisis and 
particularly of the 2008–2009 oil prices crash began to be 
felt in the Russian oil-dependent economy. In the intervening 
years, the CSR flame was kept alive in government corridors 
by the Federal Council. From 2007 to 2009, it ran annual 
hearings on the subject of CSR4 that were attended by rep-
resentatives from the government, business, and civil society 
(Federal Council of RF 2007, 2008, 2009). The office of the 
president also published several documents that engaged, 
albeit again to a limited extent, with the notion of busi-
ness responsibility, focusing on environmental and social 
legislation: the Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation 
(President of RF 2009), Action Plan for the Implementation 
of the Climate Doctrine (Government of RF 2011), and the 
Concept of Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the 
Russian Federation up to 2020 (Government of RF 2008).
We suggest that the uneven presence of “CSR” articula-
tions in the government discourse over the three different 
time periods (summarised in Table 1) points to the fact that 
the notion of “CSR” is linked with the presidential attempts 
to establish control over business. “CSR”, “business respon-
sibility” and related terms appear most frequently in the 
most antagonistic phase where the battle-lines between 
3 The Federal Council is the upper of the two chambers of the Rus-
sian federal Parliament.
4 These hearings were titled “Corporate Social Responsibility and 
socio-economic development of Russia” (2007), “Corporate Social 
Responsibility and socio-economic development of Russia” (2008) 
and “Corporate Social Responsibility in the period of crisis: Chal-
lenges, experience, possibilities” (2009).
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Table 1  Russian federal CSR policy timeline
Source: Authors
Presidential decrees are a commonly used policy instrument in the Russian Federation. The decrees are legally binding legislative acts that are 
secondary in power to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Russian federal laws
Year Document/event Presence of CSR/
responsibility of business 
discourse
1994 4 Feb—Decree by the President of Russian Federation №236 Fundamentals of state strategy of Russian Fed-
eration on environmental protection and the guarantee of sustainable development (President of RF 1994)
Marginal
1996 1 Apr—Decree by the President of Russian Federation №440 On the Concept of Transition of Russian Fed-
eration to Sustainable Development (President of RF 1996)
Marginal
8 May—Directive of the Government of the Russian Federation №559 On the Development of the Project of 
State Strategy for Sustainable Development of the Russian Federation (Government of RF 1996)
Marginal
1997 10 Dec—Decree by the President of Russian Federation №1300 On the Concept of National Security of Rus-
sian Federation (President of RF 1997)
Marginal
1998 12 Nov—National Action Plan for Environmental Protection 1999–2001 (State Committee for the Environ-
ment 1998)
Marginal
2000 28 Jul—First meeting between President Putin and leaders of largest Russian companies (Newsru.com 2001). Explicit
2001 24 Jan—Second meeting between President Putin and leaders of largest Russian companies (Arutjunova and 
Bagrov 2001; Putin 2001).
Explicit
2002 31 Aug—Ecological Doctrine of Russian Federation (Ministry of the Natural Resources of RF 2002; Mame-
dova 2010; Socio-Ecological Union 2001)
Marginal
Key Points of Russian Sustainable Development Strategy (Federal Council of RF 2002) Marginal
2003 15 Apr—All-Russia conference “Business Reputation and Social Responsibility of Business”. (Trade and 
Industry Chamber of RF 2003a).
Explicit
16 Dec—First All-Russia congress on “The State and Socially Responsible business.” (Rybakova 2003) Explicit
23 Dec—President Putin meets with the Trade and Industry Chamber in a meeting titled “On the Social 
Responsibility of Business in Modern Russia” (Grigorjeva 2003; Trade and Industry Chamber of RF 
2003b).
Explicit
2004 26 May—President Putin delivers his “Message to the Federal Council of the Russian Federation” (Federal 
Council of RF 2007)
Explicit
23 Jun—Second All-Russia congress on “The State and Socially Responsible business.” (Kondrashova 2004; 
RBK 2004).
Explicit
1 Jul—President Putin meets business leaders to discuss CSR (Open Economy 2004; Samotorova 2004; 
Sitnina and Grivach 2004; Sitnina 2004)
Explicit
16 Nov—XIV RUIE Summit (Frumkin 2004; Grigorjeva 2004; Putin 2004; RUIE 2004) Explicit
2006 30 Mar—President Putin meets business leaders (Business Russia 2006; Pchelkin 2006). Explicit
2007 15 Mar—Parliamentary hearings on “Corporate Social Responsibility in Russia: Aims, tasks, legislative 
provision” (Federal Council of RF 2007).
Explicit
2008 2 June—Parliamentary hearings on “Corporate Social Responsibility and socio-economic development of 
Russia” (Federal Council of RF 2008).
Explicit
17 Nov—Concept of Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation up to 2020, Direc-
tive of the Government of the Russian Federation №1662-p (Government of RF 2008)
Marginal
2009 23 May—Parliamentary hearings on “Corporate Social Responsibility in the period of crisis: Challenges, 
experience, possibilities” (Federal Council of RF 2009).
Explicit
17 Dec—The Climate Doctrine of Russian Federation (President of RF 2009) Marginal
2010 11 February—President Medvedev speaks at the 9th meeting of the Commission on Modernisation and Tech-
nological Development of Russian Economy (Medvedev 2010)
Explicit
1 June—Prime Minister Putin meets with the Federation of Independent Trade Unions (New Politics 2010). Explicit
14 Oct—President Medvedev meets with the participants of the Third Summit of Social Teachers and Social 
Workers (Granik 2010)
Explicit
2011 21 Apr—Meeting between Prime Minister Putin and RUIE representative (CSR Journal 2011) Explicit
25 Apr—Action Plan for the Implementation of the Climate Doctrine (Government of RF 2011) Marginal
2012 9 Feb—XIX Summit of RUIE (Putin 2012) Explicit
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the two groups, government and business, are most clearly 
drawn. President Yeltsin did not engage in discussions of 
“CSR” and did little to establish control over Russia’s oli-
garchy. By contrast, president Putin whose initial foremost 
objective was to establish the “vertical of power” referred to 
“CSR” (or equivalent) extensively in the early years of his 
presidency and held multiple discussions on the subject with 
the business leaders. It is significant that his use of “CSR” 
wanes around 2005, a period that many commentators (Yak-
ovlev 2006; Rutland 2011) identify as the end of the initial 
government-business power struggle. It is also striking that 
the initial concern about CSR comes from the office of the 
President and not from the Parliament that had an essen-
tially “revolving door” relationship with the industry. This 
provides further supporting evidence that such signifiers are 
used by actors who are engaged in antagonistic relation-
ships. In this case, the hostility existed primarily between 
the President and the business actors.
The Relational Context of Government‑Business 
“CSR” Discussion
The variability in “CSR” articulations in different relational 
contexts similarly indicates that it was linked to the presi-
dential struggle for control over business. There were three 
main fora where the “CSR” articulations appeared: formal 
policy documents, parliamentary hearings, and presidential 
discussions with the business leaders, the key one being the 
RUIE forums that occurred once or twice a year.
As described in the previous section, the formal social 
and environmental policy documents contain very few refer-
ences to “business responsibility” in addressing social and 
environmental concerns. For instance, the Climate Doctrine 
of the Russian Federation (President of RF 2009) focuses on 
the development of legal frameworks to support the environ-
mental agenda. The subsequent Action Plan for the Imple-
mentation of the Climate Doctrine (Government of RF 2011) 
contains practical points relating to legislation development. 
The closest the Climate Doctrine comes to discussing busi-
ness engagement with climate change concerns is the call 
for a dialogue between all social actors and for government 
incentives that would support environment-friendly busi-
ness modernisation. A comparable document that deals with 
social development is the Concept of Long-Term Socio-Eco-
nomic Development of the Russian Federation up to 2020 
(Government of RF 2008). Similarly, it says little about the 
responsibilities of businesses, but calls for public–private 
partnerships to support social development.
Having observed in the section above that the early inter-
est in CSR comes from the office of the President and not 
from the Parliament, it is important to note that subsequently 
Parliament did become concerned with CSR. Later parlia-
mentary discussions made much greater use of the “business 
responsibility” notion. The participants of the 2007, 2008, 
and 2009 Federal Council hearings that were specifically 
dedicated to CSR generally agreed that “CSR” was a form 
of business engagement with a variety of stakeholders, that 
it was important for business legitimacy within Russia, but 
that it should not take the form of using private funds to 
plug government budget gaps. Instead, companies should 
be equal partners in the public–private partnerships. Most 
of the discussion focused on social reporting which was her-
alded as vitally important for the competitiveness of Russian 
companies abroad.
A common theme in the parliamentary discussions was 
a reluctance of the participants, representing government 
and business, to make CSR an object of government inter-
vention. For instance, while noting that “the absence of 
standards of corporate responsibility” was a factor in weak 
foreign investment activity in Russia, government officials 
were professing the inferiority of regulation:
We really understand that legislating, development of 
regulations [including in the area of CSR] always lags 
behind life. And, perhaps, not every question can be 
addressed at the level of legislature, but there are also 
general rules of conduct. (Federal Council of RF2008, 
p. 5).
Business leaders shared this position, for instance, by reject-
ing the possibility of companies being required to publish 
social reports. One representative from the Association 
of Russian Managers (Federal Council of RF 2007, p. 37) 
argued that CSR was “not a position formulated by intel-
lectuals and lowered from above, it is a position born of 
practitioners from below”. Regulations such as the Sar-
baines-Oxley Act were regarded as prohibitively expensive 
for companies to implement (Federal Council of RF 2009). 
The vice-president of RUIE stated that
[We] are categorically against any control. Any activ-
ity, including voluntary activity, and we are speaking 
about the social responsibility of business, should be 
not be regulated by any laws, any norms. Only from 
the point of view of motivation, from the point of view 
of facilitation … (Federal Council of RF 2008, pp. 
12–13).
In the discussions with the office of the president, however, 
the business leaders’ stance was markedly different. Here, 
they explicitly asked for the government to adopt a more 
directive approach to social responsibilities of business. The 
requests often followed the business leaders’ concern about 
what they called “shadow social responsibility”. This term 
referred to an array of irregular dealings between local gov-
ernment authorities and businesses in relation to social pro-
grammes. It included government agencies making unjustifi-
able demands on the businesses (in the eyes of business) to 
 A. Zueva, J. Fairbrass 
1 3
participate in social programmes and included informally 
brokered tax break awards to businesses from local authori-
ties for contributions to social programmes.
Social programmes are financed on a local level or 
on the basis of private agreements that also provide 
opportunities for tax relief. “As a result, today we have 
the phenomenon of shadow social responsibility.”… ‘it 
is time for the government to abandon the thesis that 
the abilities of the government are limited and those of 
the business are unlimited…. Today business leaders 
do not receive clear signals from the government about 
what and how they need to do … business is waiting 
for the government expression of national priorities.’” 
(News coverage of and quotes from business leaders at 
the Second CSR Congress, Kondrashova 2004)
In the wake of the business-government disputes (and espe-
cially the Khodorkovsky case), business leaders were also 
desperate to clarify the “new rules of the game” in their 
relationship with the president (Frumkin 2004). An explicit 
call for regulatory clarity in the area of CSR is contained 
in the Social Charter of Russian Business that RUIE rati-
fied at its 2004 summit. The Charter detailed the large Rus-
sian businesses’ position on CSR, declared that CSR was a 
way to achieve social and economic goals on the basis of 
“rational balance” in the interests of varied societal groups 
and stated that:
The interaction between business and government and 
business with the civil society must be built on a public 
regulatory foundation. (RUIE 2004).
President Putin agreed with these requests in principle and 
also acknowledged the problem of government coercion of 
business into participating in social projects:
…the joint work of government and business must 
not lead to extorting business and forcing it into non-
production expenses, but this, unfortunately, happens 
both in the centre and in the regions…. There needs to 
be a regulatory base for joint [government-business] 
work on priority projects…. we expect a more active 
involvement [of business] in social projects. (Putin 
2004)
In practice, however, no action was taken to address business 
concerns. Business involvement in the development projects 
continued to be negotiated on a haphazard project-by-project 
basis and the business leaders continued to express concern 
about it years later. For example, in a 2012 RUIE summit 
declaration it was stated that:
We need to perfect the regulative foundation of the 
social partnership systems on the basis of commonly 
recognised principles that exclude direct or indirect 
coercive involvement of employers in social part-
nerships or economically unjustified responsibilities 
(RUIE 2012, p. 9).
To summarise, both the legislative and executive branches 
of the Russian government were reluctant to issue any for-
mal policy or definitive guidelines on matters such as busi-
ness participation in social development projects or non-
financial reporting. Business leaders, however, reacted to 
this reluctance differently in different relational contexts. 
They were in full agreement with the parliament, but in 
the discussions with the president, they perceived the lack 
of formal guidelines as a threat and explicitly requested a 
“regulatory foundation” to be developed that would clarify 
their responsibilities and how they were to be fulfilled. This 
happened even when business leaders brought up the same 
problems in parliamentary and presidential discussions that 
they saw as related to CSR (such as government agencies 
using the notion of social responsibility of business to effec-
tively extort funds from businesses to cover their own social 
budget deficits). This inconsistency suggests that, despite the 
same terms being used, “social responsibility of business” 
was articulated differently and played different roles in the 
parliamentary and presidential contexts. This also meant that 
different contexts saw different articulation of government 
and business.
In the next section, we focus specifically on the presi-
dential articulations of “social responsibilities of business” 
and other themes that appear alongside the terms “CSR” 
or “responsibility of business” in Mr Putin’s and then Mr 
Medvedev’s iterations.
Filling the Empty Signifier of “CSR”
Our analysis revealed that three themes consistently 
appeared in the presidential iterations on the subject of busi-
ness responsibility: (1) the social responsibility of business 
reflects contemporary social and economic concerns, (2) the 
“devastating privatisation” of the 1990s, and (3) the presen-
tations of business responsibility as a personal responsibility 
of business leaders. Below we suggest that this variety of 
articulations indicates that “social responsibility of busi-
ness” functions as an empty signifier in the Russian presi-
dents’ discourse. We argue that the three themes are held 
in a chain of equivalence by the empty signifier of “social 
responsibility of business” that the Russian presidents then 
use to articulate leading Russian businesses as being legiti-
mately subordinate to the government.
Taking these iterations on order, firstly, the Russian presi-
dents’ articulations of “social responsibilities of business” 
consistently related to the most pressing economic and social 
national concerns of the day. In the early Putin period, Mr 
Putin’s speeches on the subject of social responsibilities of 
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business, particularly in the RUIE summits, were chiefly 
concerned with ensuring business compliance with tax reg-
ulations (Grigorjeva 2003; Putin 2001). In a 2003 special 
meeting of the Trade and Industry Chamber of the Russian 
Federation entitled “On the Social Responsibility of Business 
in Modern Russia”, Mr Putin spoke of the social responsi-
bility of business as “resolution of social problems” such as 
poverty, low quality living conditions of workers, guarantee 
of labour rights, elimination of black market employment 
and investing, together with the government, in education, 
healthcare, the environment and the army (Trade and Indus-
try Chamber of RF 2003b). In one early meeting with the 
business leaders, Mr Putin started his talk about business 
responsibility with a request that the business leaders con-
tribute around 1.5 bl. roubles (~ $53 mil. at the time) for 
a fund in support of the military personnel who served in 
Russia’s conflict regions (Putin 2001). These articulations 
of responsibility clearly reflected the primary concerns of 
the 1990s and early 2000s: endemic business tax avoidance, 
economic depression, and military conflict in Chechnya.
In the later Putin/Medvedev period, the expressed under-
standings of “responsibility” changed to reflect the central 
post-2008 international financial crisis and oil price decline 
issues. For instance, at a meeting of the Commission on 
the Modernisation and Technological Development of 
the Russian Economy in 2010, Mr Medvedev linked the 
social responsibility of business to investment in innova-
tion as being crucial for Russia’s international economic 
competitiveness:
… big money presupposes big responsibility. We [gov-
ernment and business], together must make all pos-
sible effort to turn our economy in the direction of 
modernisation…. This means re-thinking the formula 
or social responsibility of business. It is not just phi-
lanthropy, and definitely not the payment of taxes that 
all naturally must pay. It is indeed the practical focus 
on innovation and, ultimately, the effective work of 
companies… (Medvedev 2010).
Mr Putin also equated the social responsibility of business 
with the business contribution to Russia’s international com-
petitiveness in a 2011 meeting with RUIE (CSR Journal 
2011). The press reported that, while giving a speech on the 
social responsibility of business, Mr Putin pointed out that 
low labour productivity was among the key factors underpin-
ning Russia’s low national economic competitiveness. He 
argued that it was inappropriate for business to economise 
on labour protection and workplace justice measures that 
could increase productivity, and that the government would 
plan out initiatives in this area that would be financed by 
business.
Viewed in combination with the presidents’ refusal to 
address the business leader’s requests for clearer official 
guidelines on the social responsibilities of business, the 
shifts in the presidents’ articulations of “business responsi-
bilities” indicate that it functions as an empty signifier. The 
absence of official guidelines leaves the “social responsi-
bility of business” signifier open to be filled with different 
meanings, such as innovation and job provision, depending 
on the current priorities, which is exactly what the Russian 
presidents did do.
The second theme that consistently appears alongside 
the notion of social responsibilities of business in post-2000 
presidential iterations is the 1990s problematic privatisa-
tion. The actual word “responsibility”, in relation to the non-
financial obligations of business, first appears in govern-
ment discourse in January 2001 during the second meeting 
between president Putin and the leaders of the largest Rus-
sian companies. This and the first meeting in the summer of 
2000 were held in the atmosphere of uncertainty about the 
nature of the relationship between the new president and the 
business elites. The business leaders were concerned about 
a potential review of the 1990s legally murky privatisation 
process, despite president Putin denying it as a possibility. In 
the second meeting, Mr Putin categorically announced that 
the business “fear of the government” (i.e. fear of privatisa-
tion review) must be replaced by “the sense of responsibility 
for the people and the country” (Newsru.com 2001; Putin 
2001). The link between the “social responsibility of busi-
ness” and the corporations’ ability to keep control over their 
assets was particularly clear in the 2004 meeting between 
RUIE and president Putin where the Social Charter of Rus-
sian Business was presented. Prior to the meeting, RUIE 
members were reported to say:
[I] am expecting that the president will address fun-
damental questions. How, for instance, does he under-
stand “social responsibility of business”? … And 
what does he think about the societal hysteria about 
oligarchs and rich people in general? (Sitnina and Gri-
vach 2004).
Vladimir Putin privately feels that the privatisation 
processes of the 1990 were unfair. As a result, there is 
a conviction that large business must take initiative in 
erasing its guilt before the society and the government. 
(Sitnina and Grivach 2004).
… oligarchs who created their empires in the time of 
Boris Yeltsin are trying to ask the government where 
and to what extent they must be “socially responsible” 
so that the government leaves them alone. (Frumkin 
2004).
President Putin, in his 2004 RUIE meeting speech, assured 
the business leaders that no privatisation revision would take 
place and, in the next sentence, started to outline his vision 
for the social responsibilities of business:
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Overall, the government must [not ‘will’!] guarantee 
the immutability of the privatisation outcomes and of 
the protection of private property rights as one of foun-
dations of the market economy. Civil servants must 
protect private property as much as the government 
property. From you [the business leaders] we expect 
higher investment in social projects, science, education 
and in the development of the so-called ‘human factor’ 
in general. Let us discuss this in more detail: We have 
already, more than once, spoken about the importance 
of a systemic understanding of the social responsibility 
of business…… (Putin 2004).
Despite these assurances, privatisation continued to surface 
in the discussions of social responsibilities of Russian busi-
ness later. For example, at the 2010 meeting of the Commis-
sion on the Modernisation and Technological Development 
of the Russian Economy mentioned above, Mr Medvedev 
followed up his characterisation of the “social responsibility 
of business” as innovation and modernisation with a depic-
tion of this responsibility as something that large companies 
owed the government for past privatisation support:
I think that it is a duty of all large private companies 
created in our country in recent years to make a seri-
ous contribution to the formation of a modern model 
of Russian economy, to Russian economic growth. All 
companies represented here at some point in the past 
received, in essence, definitive government support at 
different growth stages. This was connected with the 
re-distribution of resources in the 90s, and, recently, 
in the period of a crisis. (Medvedev 2010)
We conclude that the Russian government uses the empty 
signifier of “social responsibility of business” to portray its 
own coercion of business into compliance with its varied 
demands as being legitimate. The coercion of business into 
performing particular activities takes form of a request for 
responsible behaviour. Responsible behaviour is articulated 
as something that businesses owe to the state (i.e. business 
leaders should not fear the re-evaluation of privatisation 
results as long as they pay the debt to the state and behave 
responsibly in a way that the government prescribes). Acqui-
escence to government coercion is effectively labelled as 
“social responsibility of business”.
The third theme consistently associated with the “social 
responsibility of business” in presidential articulations is 
the notion of responsibility as a desirable individual trait 
of the business leaders as opposed to an organisational 
characteristic or practice. For example, Mr Putin in a 2004 
speech on the “systematic understanding of social responsi-
bility of business” called on Russian businesses to develop 
a “healthy patriotic instinct, responsibility for own country” 
(Putin 2004). Earlier, we mentioned that Mr Putin asked 
Russian businesses to develop a “sense of responsibility”. 
Words such as “instinct” and “sense” are more suitable for 
describing an individual state of mind as opposed to organi-
sational practice.
Later, both president Medvedev and prime minister Putin 
spoke about responsibility as a personal attribute of busi-
ness leaders. In a 2010 meeting with the Federation of Inde-
pendent Trade Unions, Mr Putin praised business owners for 
using their personal assets to save their companies during 
the financial crisis and stated that this signified a “maturing 
responsibility of business” (New Politics 2010). Similarly, 
Mr Medvedev, during the 2010 Summit of Social Teachers 
and Social Workers told his audience in a conversation about 
pension provision:
In my opinion, care for aged people is not only the 
responsibility of the government and the relatives, it 
must be the responsibility of all successful people. 
Those who reached success must make their contri-
bution. But it does not mean that money should be 
extorted from them, of course not. It rather must be a 
moral need on their part. (Granik 2010)
The speech of Prime Minister Putin at the XIX RUIE 
summit in 2012 (Putin 2012) brought up the “fundamen-
tal question” of the lack of business legitimacy in Russia 
caused by questionable privatisation process. As a measure 
to improve business legitimacy he proposed an individual 
tax on luxuries that would be “a moral and ethical measure”, 
which would encourage a “responsible approach” among 
business leaders, and would be a “socially recognised pay-
ment for the refusal to invest”. As the proposed tax applies to 
individuals and not organisations, Mr Putin presents respon-
sibility as an individual and not an organisational practice.
“CSR” as a Nodal Point in a Hegemonic Government 
Discourse
We now bring all three strands of our analysis together: 
(1) that most of the government business “responsibility” 
iterations occur in the time period characterised by antago-
nism between government and business, (2) that most of 
business-responsibility government iterations happen in 
the most antagonistic institutional context (i.e. the inter-
actions between the office of the president and the lead-
ers of large Russian companies), and (3) that the Russian 
presidents fill the signifier of “social responsibility of busi-
ness” with three key themes (economic/social concerns 
of the day, questionable past privatisation and personal 
responsibility). We contend that the timing, the context, 
and the nature of the presidential interpretations of the 
“social responsibility of business” indicate that the “social 
responsibility of business” (and equivalent terms) func-
tioned as an empty signifier in the Russian presidential 
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discourse and facilitated the establishment of a hegemonic 
discourse that would articulate and fix large Russian busi-
ness as subordinate to government.
The Russian government does not define “social respon-
sibility of business” in a stable manner. It articulates it dif-
ferently in different time periods and different interaction 
contexts. Russian presidents go as far as ignoring explicit 
requests from the business leaders for an official definition 
of their social responsibilities. The multiplicity of shifting 
articulations indicates that “social responsibility of busi-
ness” functions as an empty signifier within the government 
discourse. The use of the “social responsibility of business” 
notion also allows the Russian presidents to label their 
coercion of business leaders (through the threat of privati-
sation re-evaluation) as a request for responsible behaviour. 
This labelling helps legitimise the government’s coercive 
practices and articulates business as being subordinate to 
the government. The fact that most of these articulations 
occur in the temporal and relational context characterised 
by antagonism between businesses and the Russian execu-
tive further points to the fact that they constitute part of 
the Russian presidents’ attempt to establish a hegemonic 
discourse where business subordination of government 
would become normalised. The individualisation of social 
responsibility of businesses by articulating it as a personal 
trait of the business leaders as opposed to an organisational 
practice further serves to legitimise presidential coercion of 
individual business leaders such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky. 
Again, this function of the “social responsibility of business” 
feeds into the government bid to fix the identity of business 
as subordinate to government, effectively supporting the 
“vertical of power” agenda.
Returning to our aim to politicise and critically question 
government engagement with CSR, we suggest that our 
analysis of the Russian federal government CSR discourse 
provides an example where the function of the “CSR” (or 
equivalent) term in the government officials’ discourse is not 
limited to the facilitating of more ethical business conduct. 
Instead, the use of “CSR” or the “social responsibility of 
business” has the effect of legitimising the presidential coer-
cion of individual business leaders. It is used as a political 
tool that aids the government in articulating disparate ele-
ments such as the various pressing social needs, the debt that 
large Russian businesses supposedly owe to the government 
for turning the blind eye to privatisation irregularities, and 
the responsibility of business leaders as individuals as equiv-
alent moments under the umbrella of the “social responsibil-
ity of business”. All three of these now fixed moments come 
to represent aspects of the “social responsibility of busi-
ness”. The “social responsibility of business” systematises 
government discourse. The established chain of equivalence 
articulates business responsibility in a way that naturalises 
business subordination to the government. The outcome is 
the cancelling out of the antagonism between government 
and business and suturing of the Russian political landscape.
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of our findings. 
The left half illustrates the structure of the Russian federal 
government “CSR” discourse. The rights side is a proposed 
representation of the alternative discourse offered by the 
Russian businesses. As mentioned in the discussion of our 
Fig. 1  Russian government 
and business CSR discourse 
articulations Source: Authors, 
adapted from Walton and Boon 
(2014)
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methods above, business discourse was not our object of 
study. However, given that most of the government utter-
ances that we analysed were made in the context of meet-
ings with business leaders, we could not avoid noting some 
aspects of business articulations of their social responsibili-
ties. The nature of business articulations is represented by 
the dashed line.
Discussion
In this section, we summarise our findings and provide a 
brief discussion of how we see the contributions of our study 
in relation to the existing scholarly discussions on govern-
mental engagement with CSR. We will also reflect on the 
generalizability of our results to contexts other than Russian 
Federation.
We have provided an empirical example that supports our 
contention that government engagement with CSR should 
be treated with the same critical consideration as business 
engagement. We drew our example from a historical analy-
sis of the federal government’s CSR (social responsibility 
of business) discourse in the Russian Federation. Laclau 
and Mouffe’s (1985) social theory of hegemony provided a 
philosophical and methodological framework for analysing 
and theorising CSR in that context. Most importantly, this 
approach allowed us to view “CSR” from a different onto-
logical perspective, not as a feature of corporate behaviour, 
but as a rhetorical device that enables the construction of 
hegemonic discourses that then legitimise and normalise 
particular meanings, the positions of social actors, and the 
forms of social relations. After considering the thematic 
content of the government utterances, their timing, and the 
relational contexts in which they appear, we conclude that 
“CSR” (and equivalent terms such as “social responsibility 
of business”) functions as an empty signifier in the Russian 
government’s discourse, permitting the Russian presidents to 
legitimise their coercion of individual business leaders and 
position business as subordinate to the government.
Our key contribution is the development of a politi-
cal understanding of government engagement with CSR 
that does not presume that governments are the civically 
minded regulators of business. We argue that “CSR” can 
be fruitfully viewed as an element of discourse that allows 
government actors to structure social realities in particular 
ways, legitimise their positions, and protect their interests. 
We build on and extend a body of previous post-structural 
studies that critically examine the socio-cultural effects 
of signifiers such as “environmental protection”, “climate 
protection” and “globalisation” in the discourses of various 
social actors (Methmann 2010; Spicer and Fleming 2007; 
Stavrakakis 1997; Swyngedouw 2011).
Nonetheless, we conclude that our political understanding 
of government engagement with CSR as being complemen-
tary to (rather than contradictory) current notions of “politi-
cal CSR”. For instance, we find that some of the Russian 
government’s articulations of “social responsibility of busi-
ness” were not far removed from what Scherer and Palazzo’s 
(2011) termed “political CSR”: the Russian government 
referred to the “social responsibility of business” as being 
a type of business-partnering with other social actors such 
as local authorities in production of public goods. Treat-
ing “CSR” as an element of discourse, however, allows for 
a deeper and richer analysis of power dimensions in such 
government-business deliberations about the production 
of beneficial social outcomes (Fairbrass and Zueva-Owens 
2012; Whelan 2012).
In addition, similar to Vallentin’s (2015a) findings in con-
nection to the Danish government, we reveal that the Rus-
sian government’s articulations of “social responsibility of 
business” varied at different points in time. However, while 
Vallentin (2015a) explored the ideological understandings 
that underlay the government’s articulations of CSR, our 
focus is on the role that the term “CSR” can play in broader 
government discourses, itself supporting and legitimising 
particular ideological positions. Overall, our work offers a 
new perspective to an existing conversation about political 
aspects of government engagement with CSR and opens 
up further possibilities for a more nuanced examination of 
government engagement in CSR policy and policy-making.
Clearly, our example of the Russian Federation concerns 
only one specific country and one specific historical period 
and therefore is not wholly generalisable to other contexts. 
Some may consider the case of the Russian Federation to 
be extreme as it involves a socio-political situation that is 
discernibly different from the Western case studies that most 
frequently serve as a test-bed for the study of CSR. Argu-
ably, our findings make a minor contribution to the institu-
tional CSR literature (e.g. Jamali and Karam 2018; Kang and 
Moon 2011; Matten and Moon 2008) by describing Russian 
government’s articulations of “CSR”. Some of these articu-
lations are broadly consistent with the “developmental” 
(i.e. focused on national development) type of CSR found 
by Kang and Moon (2011) in state-led market economies. 
Simultaneously, however, some of the Russian government’s 
“CSR” articulations and their evolution over time are simi-
lar to the Danish government’s articulations as identified by 
Vallentin (i.e. where there was an initial focus on employ-
ment issues and subsequent focus on national development 
through increased business competitiveness). Nonetheless, 
our key objective is not to evaluate the activities of the Rus-
sian government or to discover the meaning of “CSR” in the 
Russian context. This would involve a different ontological 
treatment of “CSR” to the one we adopted here. Instead, 
we develop an alternative, political perspective about the 
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governmental use of the “CSR” notion. We contend that 
our findings expose the politicisation of government’s use 
of “CSR” and that these results will trigger critical studies 
across a range of different national contexts.
While we acknowledge that it is unlikely that our case-
specific findings will be replicable in other national or 
regional contexts, we contend that the analytical gener-
alisation of our broad conclusions is possible. Analytical 
(theoretical) generalisation involves building theory on a 
basis of empirical observation (Yin 1994). We are aware it 
is uncommon in management research or political science to 
use findings from the so-called “peripheral” (non-Western) 
countries to build theory that may create new understand-
ings in other parts of the world. Postcolonial theorists have 
long noted that the research conducted in the Western “core” 
has potential of gaining a place in the global scholarly con-
versation whereas findings from non-Western contexts are 
generally regarded as having local applicability only (Hoff-
man 1977; Tickner and Wæver 2009). This may well apply 
to Russia, which for centuries has served as the constitu-
tive “other” to the West, regarded both in the West and by 
some internal factions as either a “barbarous state” or as a 
“learner” who is yet to absorb Western traditions (Brown-
ing 2003; Jensen 2017; Morozov 2015). Neumann (1999) 
and Kuus (2004) observe that while the rise of postcolonial 
scholarship has led to reflection on how historical circum-
stances contribute to the modern representations of nations 
outside the core “West”, such reflexivity rarely extends to 
discussions of Russia.
However, those scholars who are working in the post-
structural international relations literature increasingly chal-
lenge this status quo and argue that
…discourses in the periphery can offer a penetrating 
critique of the assumptions, norms, and practices gov-
erning the social models in the core (Makarychev and 
Morozov 2013, p. 334).
Knowledge from the periphery can help challenge the paro-
chialism and assumed universal applicability of the knowl-
edge from the “core” and itself contribute to new interna-
tionally applicable understandings (Jack and Westwood 
2009; Tickner 2013). The latter aim, in particular, could be 
accomplished by paying attention to the possible similarities 
between different national systems as opposed to consist-
ently “othering” the non-West. As mentioned at the start of 
this paper, some authors see all governments (whether in the 
West or not) as driven by the need to stay in power and there-
fore at least partly self-interested (De Mesquita et al. 2005). 
Others note while nations with different governmental sys-
tems may differ in how they score on certain parameters 
(such as levels of corruption, property rights protection), 
the development of such parameters in different nations over 
time often follows similar trends (Besley 2006), suggesting 
that cross-fertilisation of research from different locations is 
possible. We suggest as much for the possibility of analytical 
generalisation from our findings from Russia.
At a more basic level, our findings highlight the possibil-
ity of governmental self-interest (De Mesquita et al. 2005) 
in the use of CSR discourse. The case of the Russian Federa-
tion demonstrates that the primary function of terms such as 
“CSR” and “responsibility of business” in the government 
discourse may not always be to promote socially and envi-
ronmentally responsible business conduct. This warrants a 
more critical stance towards government engagement with 
CSR in different parts of the world. “CSR” could function 
as an empty signifier in the discourse of the diverse nation 
states with authoritarian-type governmental systems because 
such governments are likely to have antagonistic relation-
ships with other social actors (De Mesquita et al. 2005). 
Governments in developed liberal democracies may draw 
on “CSR” and related concepts because of their established 
social visibility and legitimacy. Existing studies already 
indicate that the use of notions such as “climate protection” 
by large international governmental organisations (for exam-
ple, the WTO and the OECD) performs a political function, 
specifically leading to the re-branding of “business as usual” 
as being environmentally progressive (when it may not actu-
ally be) and stifling progress on the climate protection front 
as a result (see for example, Methmann 2010).
At a broader level, the treatment of “CSR” as an element 
of discourse, as opposed to a desired form of organisational 
behaviour, creates opportunities for examining the differ-
ent forms of power relations that may exist between differ-
ent social actors and exploring how these power relations 
are established and reproduced through the use of “CSR” 
and related notions. The social actors in question may be 
different in any given context and so may be the forms of 
power relations involved, but their scrutiny is made possible 
by a theorising of “CSR” as a vehicle of power within dis-
course. As a result of its residual institutional heritage, built 
up over the last few decades, “CSR” has the strong poten-
tial of becoming an empty signifier and therefore a device 
employed by various social actors in a variety of political 
interactions (Nabers 2009). This may be particularly the case 
in developed countries where the “CSR” term has been in 
use for a long period by a wide variety of social actors and, 
therefore, attained significant social legitimacy.
Conclusion
The aim of our research was to question the predominant 
understanding of government as a benign actor in the lit-
erature on government engagement with CSR. Drawing on 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) social theory of hegemony has 
enabled us to consider “CSR” from a different ontological 
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perspective and to treat it as a constitutive element of dis-
course rather than a denotation of particular organisational 
behaviours. Our analysis of the government’s use of “CSR” 
in the Russian Federation demonstrates that “CSR” can 
function as an “empty signifier”—a privileged discourse ele-
ment that serves establish hegemonic discourses that erase 
antagonisms between different social actors. In the case of 
the Russian Federation, viewing “CSR” as an element of 
discourse has allowed us to demonstrate how it has served 
to legitimise the dominance of the Russian government over 
large Russian business organisations. Ultimately, we suggest 
that it is not only businesses but also the governments that 
can hijack the notion of CSR to promote agendas other than 
social development and environmental protection. We there-
fore call for more detailed and critical study of government 
engagement with CSR across a range of types of polities and 
economies worldwide.
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